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CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES: ARE 
THERE METHODS OTHER THAN THE 
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX THAT COULD 
BETTER ADDRESS PROBLEMS 
ASSOCIATED WITH WEALTH 
CONCENTRATION? 
RAY D. MADOFF* 
Abstract: This Commentary analyzes three articles generated from the Sym-
posium “The Centennial of the Estate and Gift Tax: Perspectives and Recom-
mendations,” held on October 2, 2015 at Boston College Law School. This 
Commentary explores the underlying purpose of the estate and gift tax: elimi-
nating wealth inequality. It then considers the three articles’ proposed alterna-
tive tax systems—namely an accession tax and a wealth tax—that could more 
adequately address the problem of wealth concentration, and evaluates the 
merits of each.  
INTRODUCTION 
The estate and gift tax is in a precarious position. Once a well-accepted 
part of our country’s overall tax system imposing significant levels of tax on 
large swaths of the population, today it applies only to the smallest percent-
age of the public, and at relatively modest rates. And still it is met with gen-
eral antipathy, not just by Republican politicians who have long held estate 
tax repeal as one of their core platform positions, but even by some Demo-
crats who treat it like Voldemort, the villain from the Harry Potter series 
whose name must not be spoken.1 
One might conjecture that a diminished need for the estate tax has 
caused its unpopularity. But this is far from the case. Congress enacted the 
original estate tax to address wealth inequality, which by all accounts is at 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, Ray D. Madoff. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. She is the author of IMMORTALITY AND THE 
LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD (2010). 
 1 See Peter Baker, House Votes to Repeal Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/us/politics/house-votes-to-repeal-estate-tax.html?_r=0 [https://perma.
cc/7SPF-3BCH] (discussing the house vote to repeal what Republicans call the “death tax”); Si-
obhan Hughes, Plan to Raise Estate Tax Divides Democrats, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324020804578151430887301890 [https://perma.
cc/T2RU-TGSV] (calling the estate tax a “thorny issue” for some Democrats). 
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an all-time high today.2 Moreover, the notion of wealth inequality as a soci-
etal problem has received broad acceptance across political and socio-
economic spectra.3 
This leaves us with a great contemporary conundrum: why are estate 
and gift taxes so reviled when the problem that the taxes were designed to 
address is so prevalent and so widely recognized? Regardless of the answer 
to this conundrum, a more promising way forward may involve abandoning 
the estate and gift tax in favor of an alternative, raising the question: are 
there methods other than the estate and gift tax that could better address 
problems associated with wealth concentration? 
The accompanying series of articles by Professors David Duff, Miran-
da Perry Fleischer, and David Shakow provides a strong analytic structure 
to explore: (1) the underlying purposes for the current estate and gift tax;4 
(2) possible alternative tax systems that could best fulfill these purposes;5 
and (3) what these systems would look like in detail.6  
I. WHAT IS THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE OF THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAX? 
The starting point for any inquiry about competing tax systems is to 
determine what problem we are trying to solve; only then can we consider 
which alternatives most effectively solve the problem. 
For most tax systems, the answer is relatively straightforward: the pur-
pose of a tax is to generate revenue for the government. Nevertheless, the 
estate tax is unlike other taxes because it fulfills multiple purposes and be-
cause it has generally done a fairly poor job in terms of generating revenue. 
As Professor Duff points out in Alternatives to the Gift and Estate Tax, 
since the end of World War II, income, consumption, and social security 
taxes have become the dominant means of raising revenue in most devel-
oped countries.7 Indeed, in the United States, the percentage of revenue 
raised by estate and gift taxes has always been under 5%, and in 2015 it is 
expected to be under 1%.8 Moreover, even if Congress could revise the es-
tate and gift tax in such a way as to generate greater revenue (by increasing 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capital Income Tax Data 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Paper, Working 
Paper No. 20,625, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RP5L-8Q9N]. 
 3 Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America—One Wealth Quintile at a Time, 6 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 9, 9 (2011), http://www.people.hbs.edu/mnorton/norton%20ariely.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/26LL-PJRC] (noting that most agree that wealth inequality is high). 
 4 See infra notes 7−17 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 18−21 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 22−53 and accompanying text. 
 7 David G. Duff, Alternatives to the Gift and Estate Tax, 57 B.C. L. REV. 893, 896 (2016). 
 8 Id. 
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rates and/or decreasing exemption amounts), these same results could be 
more efficiently accomplished through adjustments to other taxes. 
Professor Duff explores—and ultimately rejects—other possible justi-
fications for the current estate tax system.9 These include the estate tax’s 
role in contributing to the overall progressivity of the tax system by impos-
ing a larger burden on those with greater ability to pay (promoting “vertical 
equity”), increasing the fairness of the system by capturing an ability to pay 
that is not otherwise captured by the existing system (promoting horizontal 
equity), and curbing overall concentrations of wealth.10 Professor Duff finds 
each of these rationales inadequate for purposes of justifying the estate tax, 
and this author generally agrees with his analysis.11 There is, however, an 
additional purpose of the estate tax that should be added to Professor Duff’s 
list: the estate tax promotes fairness by providing an essential counterweight 
to the extraordinary benefits conferred on inherited wealth under our in-
come tax system. 
Our current income tax system favors inherited wealth in two signifi-
cant ways. First, it entirely excludes inherited wealth from taxable income. 
No matter how much wealth an individual inherits, whether it is $100, 
$100,000, or $100 million, the income tax system treats that individual the 
same as a person who inherits nothing.12 The failure to tax inherited wealth 
is particularly glaring in light of the substantial taxes imposed on wages of 
working Americans, who are subject to income taxes of up to 39.6%13 and 
self-employment taxes of up to 15.3%.14 This decision to exclude inher-
itance from the income tax base while taxing wages at the highest rates ef-
fectively shifts the tax burden from heirs to wage earners. 
Second, those with inherited wealth enjoy special benefits with respect 
to taxation from sales of property. Normally, when an individual sells prop-
erty, he or she is subject to tax on the difference between the amount he or 
she receives from the sale and the original purchase price. If the property is 
passed on by gift, the recipient has the same basis in the property that the 
donor had, thus passing on any built-in gains to the recipient. There is a 
special basis rule, however, that applies to property passed on at death: in 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See id. at 900−06. 
 10 See id. at 900−04. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See I.R.C. § 102 (2012). This rule also applies to property received by gift and through life 
insurance. See id. 
 13 See Percentage Method Tables for Income Tax Withholding, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15/ar02.html#en_US_2016_publink1000254686 [https://perma.
cc/U39T-ZULS]. 
 14 See Self-Employment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Self-Employment-Tax-Social-Security-and-Medicare-Taxes#1 [https://
perma.cc/B96A-UMVW].  
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that case, the heir receives the property with a basis equal to the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the decedent’s death (“stepped-up ba-
sis”). The effect of stepped-up basis is that an heir can sell inherited proper-
ty and pay no capital gains taxes, even if the decedent had significant un-
taxed, built-in gains at the time of death. 
These factors reinforce Professor Duff’s conclusion that “the unique 
virtue of a wealth transfer tax is to target unearned sources of wealth that 
not only contribute to wealth inequality, but do so in a way that perpetuates 
dynastic concentrations of wealth and power and undermines fair equality 
of opportunity.”15 
The problems of unearned wealth and dynastic power also motivate 
Professor Fleischer’s article, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax 
to Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers.16 She argues that the problem with 
large transfers at death is that they bestow “unearned power and influence 
over others.”17 This problem is distinctly different from the problems raised 
by inequality caused by other factors, such as earned (as opposed to inherit-
ed) wealth, and relatively modest inheritance: that which does not rise to the 
level of granting power and influence over others. As she notes, a couple 
hundred-thousand or even a million dollars might make someone’s life bet-
ter off, but wouldn’t afford the ability to exert power and influence over 
others. 
Having reached some modicum of agreement on the fundamental pur-
pose of the estate tax—as a way of countering problems raised by large 
amounts of inherited wealth—we still must consider and evaluate alterna-
tive methods for accomplishing this result. 
II. CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE METHODS 
We think of the estate tax as the only (or at least the most natural) way 
of imposing taxes on inheritances, but in fact there are several different sys-
tems that can be used. Although the estate and gift tax is imposed on the 
donor on the basis of the donor’s accumulated lifetime and death time trans-
fers, other possibilities exist that shift the focus to the recipient’s finances. 
These include an “accessions tax,” which imposes taxes on the recipient on 
the basis of the amount of gratuitous receipts received during the recipient’s 
lifetime, or an inheritance tax which imposes taxes on the recipient on the 
amount of gratuitous transfers made, calculated on an annual basis. Still 
other alternatives involve modifications to the income tax system: either 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Duff, supra note 7, at 912. 
 16 Miranda Perry Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to Combat Dynas-
tic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2016). 
 17 Id. at 914. 
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making the transfer of property a realization event for the donor (resulting 
in capital gains taxes on the gain), or treating gifts and bequests as taxable 
income to the recipient.18 
The challenge in considering alternatives to our current tax system is 
that they need to succeed on many levels in order to be effective.19 For ex-
ample, a successful tax system must be: fair (or appear to be fair) to the 
public at large; manageable for those taxpayers who are subject to it; en-
forceable by those charged with its enforcement; administrable by those 
charged with its administration; and consistent with the country’s broader 
societal values.  
The tax systems that we currently have—the income tax system and 
the estate and gift tax system—may not meet all of these ideals, but their 
sheer familiarity often makes us more accepting of their limitations. Never-
theless, when considering new tax systems—like an accessions tax and a 
wealth tax—their unfamiliarity makes us more wary and less accepting of 
their flaws. 
This skepticism makes the work of Professors Fleischer and Shakow all 
the more challenging. They must consider how their proposed systems—the 
accessions tax and the wealth tax, respectively—would function on all levels 
and how they would handle novel issues, like new types of valuation prob-
lems, as well as more familiar ones, such as how to handle family businesses 
and charitable giving. Section A of this Part explores Professor Fleischer’s 
proposed accessions tax.20 Section B examines Professor Shakow’s wealth 
tax.21  
A. Considering an Accessions Tax 
It is not surprising that having identified a similar purpose of the estate 
tax, both Professors Duff and Fleischer also find that an accessions tax best 
addresses their shared concerns. The strength of the accessions tax is that it 
focuses on the recipient of property (who, after all, is the potential power 
holder) instead of the donor. By imposing taxes based on the recipient, it 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Unfortunately the authors did not have time to consider the value of extending the income 
tax to include gifts and inheritances. Although this might be over-inclusive in terms of handling 
dynastic wealth, it is probably more politically viable, as many Americans already assume that 
inherited wealth is subject to income taxes. 
 19 In this way, it is similar to Tolstoy’s famous line: “Happy families are all alike; every un-
happy family is unhappy in its own way.” LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Joel Carmichael 
trans., Bantam Books 1960) (1877). What this seemingly enigmatic statement means is that a 
happy family must satisfy myriad criteria; failure to satisfy a single one can create an unhappy 
family. Similarly, a successful tax system (like a happy family) must satisfy many different crite-
ria. 
 20 See infra notes 22−39 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 40−55 and accompanying text. 
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encourages the donor to break up his or her estate into smaller shares, as 
that will result in an overall lower tax liability, as each recipient will have 
his or her own exemption level and rate ladder.22  
Professor Fleischer’s article in particular makes an important contribu-
tion to the literature by articulating the details and challenges of her pro-
posed accessions tax.23 These various examples illustrate that when evaluat-
ing a proposed tax system, the devil is in the details. Still, Professor 
Fleischer threads the needle in such a way that allows her conclusions about 
what constitutes an accession to make sense.24 Nevertheless, she knows that 
she will be unable to make rules that adequately capture all situations in 
which a person has achieved greater influence and power.25 To address that 
problem, she also recommends imposing a special estate tax whenever as-
sets are transferred to a trust whose beneficiaries are somehow able to exer-
cise substantial influence over those assets, even if the rules would not im-
pute an accession until a later point.26  
In the end, Professor Fleischer has done much of the heavy lifting for a 
legislative body with the vision, integrity, and political acumen needed to 
forge a new solution to an ongoing and pernicious problem. Her proposal 
addresses the issues of exemption amounts, annual exclusions, distinctions 
based on relationships, trusts and powers of appointment, charitable dona-
tions, and family farms and businesses.27 
1. Exemption Amounts 
The critical task of any tax designed to curb large concentrations of 
wealth is to delineate an appropriate cut-off for “large.” Those interested in 
addressing solely the issue of inequality might impose taxes even when the 
inequality is minimal. But because Professor Fleischer is primarily con-
cerned with curbing power that results from extreme inequality, she chooses 
a per-recipient exemption amount that is actually higher than that which we 
have seen in the estate tax world: each individual would be able to inherit 
$10–20 million before being subject to tax.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Fleischer, supra note 16, at 922. Professor Fleischer notes how poorly the current estate 
tax system works from this perspective because it draws no distinction based on whether the 
wealth is being broken up or not. See id. Alternatively, Professor Shakow argues for an annual 
wealth tax imposed on living taxpayers. David J. Shakow, A Wealth Tax: Taxing the Estates of the 
Living, 57 B.C. L. REV. 947 (2016); see infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Professor 
Shakow’s article). 
 23 See Fleischer, supra note 16, at 927−46. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. at 927. 
 26 See id. at 939−41. 
 27 See id. at 928−29, 937−44. 
 28 See id. at 928. 
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2. Annual Exclusions 
Gifts are a regular part of human life, and in order to reduce the intru-
siveness and administrative burdens of a gift tax, it is useful to set an 
amount under which no reporting is required. Professor Fleischer adopts the 
current annual exclusion of $14,000 for lifetime gifts and includes an addi-
tional annual exclusion of $100,000 for bequests received.29 Transfers with-
in these amounts would not only avoid taxation, but would also not be sub-
ject to reporting requirements.30 
3. Distinctions Based on Relationships 
Under our current estate tax system, unless the transfer is to a spouse, 
all recipients are treated the same regardless of the particular relationship 
between the donor and the recipient. Professor Fleischer, however, proposes 
to tax receipts from close relatives more heavily than other gratuitous trans-
fers.31 Initially this seems peculiar, as most inheritance taxes impose lighter 
taxes on transfers to closer family members and heavier taxes on transfers 
to more distant relatives. 32 Under Professor Fleischer’s system, transfers 
between spouses would remain tax free, but transfers to immediate relatives 
(defined as lineal ascendants and descendants and siblings of the decedent 
and their spouses) would be taxed at roughly twice the rate of transfers to 
other individuals (cousins, nieces, nephews, and friends).33 Her goal is to 
encourage donors to spread their wealth more widely than they otherwise 
might.34 
4. Trusts and Powers of Appointment 
The treatment of trusts is a challenging one for an accessions tax. Pro-
fessor Fleischer does an admirable job of exploring whether the tax should 
be imposed on creation, vesting, or distribution from the trust.35 She recog-
nizes that in keeping with the goal of her accessions tax, the taxable mo-
ment should ideally be at the time that the trust interest enhances the hold-
er’s influence and power.36 But given the huge variety of trust interests, this 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See id. at 929. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. at 930. 
 32 This is presumably based on some notion that there is a greater right of inheritance from 
closer relatives, and inheritances from more distant relatives results in more of a windfall to the 
recipient. 
 33 See Fleischer, supra note 16, at 930. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. at 933−41. 
 36 See id. at 934. 
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precise moment is not self-evident. Moreover, the ability to exert control 
also depends upon whether or not the beneficiary is also a trustee, and fur-
ther, about the trustee’s particular powers. Powers of appointment raise a 
similar challenging issue. General powers of appointment clearly afford this 
power, but what about broadly granted non-general powers? One thing we 
know from the estate and gift tax world is that non-general powers of ap-
pointment can still confer great power on the holder. 
5. Charitable Donations 
The issue of transfers to charities raises a more interesting question. 
Our current income tax and estate and gift tax tend to grant favorable tax 
treatment for transfers to all § 501(c)(3) organizations, regardless of their 
degree of control.37 Professor Fleischer recognizes how an individual can be 
granted significant control and influence even through a charitable entity.38 
For that reason, she wisely recommends that transfers to charities controlled 
by a family member should be taxed, though at a lower rate than that im-
posed on property controlled outright. 
6. Family Farms and Businesses 
Any tax on wealth is likely to raise issues for farms and family busi-
nesses. This has been the bugaboo of the estate and gift tax system: oppo-
nents have used the specter of forced liquidation of small businesses and 
farms to argue against the estate tax. An accessions tax arguably raises the 
same concern. Professor Fleischer addresses this concern in two ways: first, 
the large $20 million exemption will cover the vast majority of family farms 
and businesses; and second, in cases in which the exemption does not apply, 
she provides relief for those taxpayers whose tax liability exceeds the liquid 
assets received.39 
B. Considering a Wealth Tax 
As an alternative to an accessions tax, Professor Shakow considers the 
viability of an annual wealth tax in his article, A Wealth Tax: Taxing the Es-
tates of the Living.40 He argues that a wealth tax could serve as a substitute 
                                                                                                                           
 37 The deduction for contributions to private foundations are in some ways less favorable than 
to public charities. 
 38 See Fleischer, supra note 16, at 942−43. 
 39 See id. at 943−44 & n.143. 
 40 See generally Shakow, supra note 22. 
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not just for the estate tax, but for the income tax as well.41 It is in this last 
role that Professor Shakow focuses his attention.42 
As a historical matter, Professor Shakow notes that the purpose of the 
estate tax was to impose the tax burden on “those deriving the most benefit 
and protection from the Government.” 43 He suggests that based on this 
standard, however, Congress likely proposed the estate tax as a “surrogate” 
for a wealth tax.44 Congress likely declined a wealth tax because an annual 
property valuation seemed more daunting than simply measuring income. 
But after more than a century of the income tax system, Professor Shakow 
asks whether it is time to re-examine this issue.45 His article’s goal is to do 
just that: take seriously the concerns of enacting a wealth tax.46 
A wealth tax depends on accurate valuations of property. Indeed, one 
of the consistent arguments brought against a wealth tax is the difficulty in 
valuation. Although the values of some types of wealth are readily measur-
able, others are not. Professor Shakow notes that critics have listed a range 
of assets as particularly difficult to value: real estate, closely held stock, 
non-corporate business assets, farm assets, private equity and hedge funds, 
and other limited partnerships.47 Nevertheless, Professor Shakow considers 
each of these categories and shows how valuation might not be as difficult 
as it first seems.48 For example, real estate (which comprises twenty-two 
percent of all assets) is already subject to regular valuation by local property 
taxes as well as private valuation services like Zillow.49 
Where valuation of assets remains a problem—such as in closely held 
businesses—Professor Shakow points out that determining income can also 
be problematic.50 In support of this, he cites a 2007 report from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, estimating that only forty-three percent 
of income from sole proprietorships was being accurately reported.51 The 
accuracy of the valuation can be affected by the taxpayer’s interest in avoid-
ing the taxes. This in turn is affected by the tax rates, as higher tax rates pre-
sumably give greater incentive for taxpayers to reduce valuation.  
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. at 951. 
 42 See generally id. 
 43 Id. at 948 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 64-922 (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 22, 23). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. at 949. 
 46 See id. at 949−50. 
 47 See id. at 953. 
 48 See id. at 952−58. 
 49 Id. at 953−54. 
 50 See id. at 955. 
 51 Id. at 955 & n.52 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A 
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIE-
TOR NONCOMPLIANCE 1 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265399.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SNB-
SDJ5] (estimating that sole proprietors misreported 57% of their income in 2001)). 
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Professor Shakow’s plan works to ameliorate this dilemma. He de-
signed it to operate as a substitute for the individual and corporate income 
tax.52 As such, it can use a relatively low rate of taxation: approximately 
1.6%. He argues that this low rate provides less of an incentive to underval-
ue property.53 Yet this argument fails to take into account the fact that alt-
hough a single tax of 1.6% might seem low, an annual tax at that rate quick-
ly adds up. As such, taxpayers may not be so sanguine regarding the issue 
of valuation. 
Moreover, Professor Shakow chose the 1.6% rate as a way for the 
wealth tax to approximate the same amount of taxes raised by the current 
income tax system.54 It also leaves the burden on both wages and capital 
roughly the same as under current law. But to fulfill the purpose of the es-
tate tax—to impose higher taxes on those deriving the most benefit and pro-
tection from government—then the tax rate would need to be significantly 
increased. There would also likely be a greater emphasis on taxes on capital 
as opposed to taxes on wages. This paradigm would increase incentives for 
taxpayers to focus on questions of valuation. 
Professor Shakow has provided a valuable service in answering the 
concerns raised by the estate tax.55 Still, it seems unlikely to me that Con-
gress will impose a wealth tax as a substitute for the income tax. In this age 
of growing awareness of wealth inequality, however, it seems increasingly 
probable that Congress may adopt a wealth tax as a supplement to the in-
come tax as a way of promoting vertical equity. When legislatures turn to 
this issue, Professor Shakow’s analysis will serve them well. 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 951. 
 53 As Professor Shakow notes, “[T]o the extent that the wealth tax described in this Article 
leads to a flat tax rate on wealth that is around 1.6%, valuation issues must be quite great for tax-
payers to pursue them very far.” Id. 
 54 See id. at 971. 
 55 See id. 
